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NEW YORK v. SHORE REALTY
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985)
CERCLA: The non-listing of a hazardous waste site on the National

PrioritiesList does not bar a state's recovery of costs incurred in
an independent response action to the release of hazardous wastes.
INTRODUCTION
New York v. Shore Realty' concerns a state's independent response to
a release of hazardous wastes at a site that was not on the National
Priorities List [NPL]. 2The state is seeking to recover its costs of response
from the party responsible for the contamination. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act of 1980
[CERCLAJ, 3 however, cost recovery is limited to response costs that are
consistent with the National Contingency Plan [NCP] .4 Part of the NCP
is the national inventory of hazardous waste sites, called the NPL. The
focus of this case is a hazardous waste site which is not listed on the
NPL. New York's ability to recover turns on whether a site's presence
on the National Priorities List is a general requirement for consistency
with the National Contingency Plan. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit [Second Circuit] decided that presence on the NPL was not generally required for consistency with the NCP and, therefore, the state was
not barred from recovering its response costs.
The first section of this Note focuses on the background and statutory
underpinnings of CERCLA. The second section analyzes district court
decisions which consider whether presence on the. NPL is required for
consistency with the NCP so that the state may recover response costs
under CERCLA., The Note compares the Second Circuit's decision in
Shore Realty with these cases. The final section of the Note explores
some of the ramifications of Shore Realty, with particular attention to the
effect the holding may have on response cost recovery actions where the
plaintiff is a private non-governmental party.
CERCLA HISTORY
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
I. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Shore Realty].
2. The NPL is an inventory which ranks the worst hazardous waste sites in the nation in need of
immediate federal attention. Infra notes 14-16.
3. 42 U.S.C. H 9601-57 (1982). For the sake of convenience. all references to CERCLA in this
Note use the public law numbering, i.e. CERCLA 101-15.
4. The National Contingency Plan guides federal cleanup actions in response to a release of
hazardous wastes. Infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. The state's suit for recovery of response
costs is based on CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A) which states that responsible parties are liable for "all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by ...a State not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan." Shore Realty. 759 F.2d at 1042.
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Liabilities Act of 1980 was the Congressional response to cataclysmic
environmental disasters caused by abandoned hazardous waste sites.5
Congress found that improper hazardous waste disposal occurred extensively throughout the country.6 Prior to CERCLA, Congress enacted the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA], a cradle-to-grave
regulatory scheme designed to track and control the passage of hazardous
wastes from generation to disposal. However, RCRA proved to be
inadequate8 in addressing problems caused by releases9 of hazardous
wastes at abandoned or inactive sites.' 0 Consequently, CERCLA was
specifically designed to address these problems."
The primary goals of CERCLA were to inventory inactive hazardous
waste sites, provide the federal government with the tools necessary to
pursue the immediate cleanup of improperly disposed hazardous waste,
and make the parties responsible for the problems bear the cost of the
response actions. 2 Several key sections of CERCLA implement these
goals.
Inventorying the nation's hazardous waste sites is accomplished through
the use of the National Contingency Plan [NCP]. 3 The NCP provides the
federal government with guidelines and describes methods for discovering, investigating, evaluating, and responding to releases of hazardous
5. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 584 (1980). The most notorious example of such a
disaster occurred at the Love Canal subdivision in Niagara Falls, New York, where families suffered
injuries, severe in some cases, as a result of leaking toxic wastes.
6. H.R. REP. .No. 1016. 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1, 18-20, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6119, 6121-23.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1982).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2nd Ses's. 1. 17, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6119, 6120. RCRA's principal fault was that it was directed towards regulation of the source
of hazardous wastes and was not concerned with the results of hazardous waste disposal. United
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. INEPACCO], 579 F.Supp. 823, 835 (W.D.S.D. 1984).
9. Release is a comprehensive term. It is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment. " CERCLA 101(22).
10. Abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites are not directly defined in CERCLA. However
they are effectively included within the definition of facility: "any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline . . . storage container, rolling stock . . . or any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be
located." CERCLA 101(9).
11. CERCLA was intended "to bring order to the array of partly redundant, partly inadequate
federal hazardous substances cleanup and compensation laws.'" F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & D.
TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC'TION: LAW AND POLICY 568 (1984). CERCLA was signed into
law by President Carter on Dec. 11, 1980.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. I, 17, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6119, 6120. Subsequent judicial interpretations of CERCLA verify these as the principal
Congressional concerns. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. I100, Il 12
(D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Wade. 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Penn. 1983).
13. The NCP appears at 40 C.F.R. 300.61-.72 (1986).
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wastes.' 4 An important function of the NCP is to identify, on a National
Priorities List [NPL], the worst hazardous waste sites in the nation. , The
NPL ranking reflects a prioritization
of those sites in need of immediate
6
federal response actions.
7
Congress also provided the federal government with authority to respond
to releases of hazardous wastes. Whenever a release poses an imminent
and substantial threat to public health or welfare, the federal government
may act immediately.'" Federal responses are financed by the Superfund
[Fund]. ' 9 The government can seek Superfund reimbursement through a
14. Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA] to develop a plan "to reflect
and effectuate the responsibilities and powers created by this Act (and] establish procedures and
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants." CERCLA 105. Consequently, the NCP outlines the process of inventorying hazardous waste sites, it
contains criteria for determining priorities of response actions among the highest priority sites in
each state, and it aids in determining appropriate response actions. The NCP also defines the roles
and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments.
15. CERCLA 105(B). The NPL appears at 40 C.F.R. 300 App. B (1986).
16. 40 C.F.R. 300.68(a) (1986). The NPLis part of the NCP. Hazardous waste sites which appear
on the NPL are selected by means of a hazard ranking system. States wishing to submit sites for
inclusion on the NPL perform the hazard ranking. The hazard ranking system is found at 40 C. FR.
300 App. A (1986).
The criteria for ranking a site include the possible risk to the population, the potential hazard of
substances at a given site, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies and other
pathways which may affect human health, and the potential for the destruction of sensitive ecosystems.
After potential sites are ranked and submitted to the EPA, they are reviewed and consolidated into
the NPL. Any site which scores 28.5 or more is included on the NPL.
17. Responses include removal or short-term actions as well as remedial or long-term actions.
CERCLA 101(23), (24), and (23).
18. CERCLA 104(a). The President gave the EPA the authority to act in his stead. Exec. Order
No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982). Herein, federal government and EPA are used interchangeably.
The EPA has two options when it responds to a release. It can compel the responsible party to
perform the cleanup. CERCLA 106. In the alternative, the EPA itself can cleanup the hazardous
waste using money from the Superfund. CERCLA 104, and 11 l(a). Federal responses include
removal or short-term actions as well as remedial or long-term actions. If the EPA performs the
response action, it can seek reimbursement from the responsible parties in a cost recovery action.
CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A).
19. "Superfund" is the popular name referring to CERCLA in general. However, the Superfund
(Fund] itself was established primarily for financing government cleanup of hazardous wastes or
reimbursing parties who performed the cleanup. CERCLA I 11.The original S1.6 billion Fund was
supported through two avenues: from appropriations of general revenue and from a tax imposed on
crude oil, imported petroleum products, and basic chemicals. CERCLA 221.
With the passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [SARA], the funding rates and mechanisms of the Fund changed
significantly. Instead of two sources of funding the new Hazardous Substances Superfund. CERCLA
221(a), five tax resource pool will generate $8.5 billion over a five-year period: $2.759 billion from
an excise tax on petroleum; $1.365 billion
from an excise tax on feedstock chemicals; $.057 billion
from a tax on imported chemical derivatives; $2.522 billion from an environmental tax; and $1.250
billion appropriation from general revenues. 16 ELR 10.413 (1986).
There are several changes in the new funding mechanisms worth noting. Whereas the tax on
petroleum used to be .79 cents per barrel, with SARA there is a two-tiered tax of 8.2 cents per
barrel on domestic crude oil and 11.7 cents per barrel on all imported petroleum products. D. HAYES
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response cost recovery action"° against the parties responsible for the
hazardous substance release," With CERCLA, Congress attempted to

provide the federal government with a framework for rational management
of the immense task of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
CERCLA also addresses cleanups performed by parties other than the

federal government." However, difficult problems of interpretation arise
when a cleanup is performed without any federal involvement. Because
CERCLA was drafted primarily to guide cleanup actions undertaken by
the federal government, it is difficult to transfer its provisions to nonfederal response actions. For example, the federal government is required
to follow a specific set of procedures when responding to a release. 3
However, there is no explicit requirement that these same procedures
apply when a non-federal party responds to a release, and almost no
legislative guidance on whether they are implicitly required in such a
case.

New York v. Shore Realty presented this difficult question of statutory
construction, because there, a non-federal party, New York State, sought
to recover its costs of response from a private party. New York's response
to the hazardous waste site had taken place entirely without federal involvement and outside the contours of the NCP. The specific question in
the case was whether a state's response costs could be consistent with
11: A NEw MANDATE 84 (1987) (Bureau of National Affairs Special
Report). In addition, a new broad-based industry wide environmental tax was adopted rather than
imposing a tax on hazardous chemical generators alone. Id. at 85.
Principal uses of the Fund include payment for: response costs incurred by the government
(CERCLA II I(a)(l)); response costs incurred by any other party as a result of carrying out the NCP
(CERCLA II l(a)(2)); the costs of restoring or replacing destroyed natural resources (CERCLA
II I(c)(3)); and certain medical costs such as epidemiologic and long-term health effect studies
(CERCLA II I(c)(4)).
20. CERCLA 107 (a)(4)(A).
21. The four classes of potentially responsible parties found in CERCLA 107(a) include:
& C. MAcKERRON, SUPERFUND

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel ...

or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for the disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance.
22. The statute permits states to recover response costs from responsible parties, CERCLA
107(a)(4)(A). Additionally, the statute contains a private (non-governmental) right of action to recover
response costs. CERCLA 107(a)(4)(B). Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir.
1985).
23. The procedures are the NCP. Supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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the NCP and therefore recoverable when the site was not listed on the
NPL, which is itself a part of the NCP.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Donald LeoGrande [LeoGrande] was the principal officer and owner
of Shore Realty Corporation [Shore]."' LeoGrande incorporated Shore
for the express purpose of purchasing a 3.2 acre peninsular site on which
he intended to construct condominiums.' The purchase agreement provided LeoGrande with an option to withdraw from the purchase of the
property subsequent to an environmental study.6
At the time of the purchase agreement, the property was operated as
an illegal 2" hazardous waste storage facility' by the tenants Applied Environmental Services, Inc. [AES] and Hazardous Waste Disposal, Inc.
[HWD]. 9 Roughly 700,000 gallons of hazardous wastes, chemicals, and
contaminated solids were stored on the property in various containers. 3°
Shore's environmental consultant, WTM Management Corporation [WTMI,
conducted a detailed study of the property in July, 1983." The study
indicated the facility was deteriorating due to "little if any preventive
maintenance,"" and there were signs of corrosion and seepage from many
of the containers." In addition, WTM's testing indicated several spills
of hazardous wastes had occurred at the site, and hazardous substances
were continuing to leach into the ground water and the neighboring harbor. I
LeoGrande did not choose to void the purchase agreement." Instead,
he sought a waiver of liability' for the disposal of the hazardous wastes
24. Shore Realty. 759 F.2d at 1038.
25. Id. The property was located at Glenwood Landing. Nassau County, New York.
26. Id. The purchase agreement was dated July 14, 1983.
27. Id. The tenants violated state requirements by not having a permit to operate either a hazardous
waste storage facility or a permanent hazardous waste disposal facility.
28. Facility is a comprehensive term. Supra note 10.
29. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1038.
30. Id. The wastes were placed in over 400 drums, eleven tanks, four roll-on/roll-off containers,
and one tank truck trailer. The wastes are various hazardous substances such as benzene, dichlorobenzenes, ethyl benzene, tetrachlorethylene, trichlomethylene, 1.1, I-trichloroethene. chlordane,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and his (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate. These toxics are dangerous to
the envimnment and humans can develop cancer if the substances are touched, inhaled, or ingested.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting from the environmental study).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1039.
36, id. The request for a waiver was an attempt to separate ownership of the land from responsibility for cleaning up the hazardous wastes. Shore attempted to avoid liability for the cleanup by
arguing that it did not cause the release; it merely took possession of the land which was already
contaminated. The court ultimately rejected this argument because Shore had full knowledge of the
illegal operations conducted by AES and HWD at the property. Id. at 1048-49 (discussion of
CERCLA affirmative defense). See also infra note 56.
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from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
[DEC]."' The waiver was denied, and after taking title, Shore evicted

AES and HWD.1' However, for three months after Shore had taken title
and before leaving the property, AES and HWD continued to deposit
hazardous wastes at the site. "'
Subsequent to a DEC inspection of the site, the State of New York '
brought suit against Shore and LeoGrande in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. The state sought an injunction
requiring LeoGrande and Shore to cleanup the hazardous waste disposal
site at Glenwood Landing. 4 ' The site was not listed on the NPL.42 The
state claim was based on CERCLA abatement authority and pendent state
law of public nuisance." The state requested damages for costs resulting
from both an assessment of conditions at the site and from supervising
the removal of several drums of hazardous waste from the site."
Although Shore did remove some of the drums pursuant to court order,'
a subsequent DEC inspection revealed that the site was approaching a
criti6al danger point.' One month later, the district court granted the state
a partial summary judgment, finding Shore and LeoGrande liable for
response costs. 7 The district court issued a permanent injunction ordering
the defendants to cleanup the hazardous waste site." Shore appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The issue before the Second Circuit was whether New York's
37. Shore Realt . 759 F2d at 1039.
38. Id. Shore took title on Oct. 13, 1983. and evicted AES and HWD 6n Jan. 5. 1984.
39. Id.
40. New York v. Shore Realty. 21 ERC 1430 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
41. Id
42. Shore Real., 759 F.2d at 1045.
43. Id. at 1037. The state sought to ground its abatement authority on CERCLA 106. The public
nuisance claims stem from common law and New York's property law. See N.Y.Real Prop. Actions
and Proceedings Law § 841 (McKinney 1979).
44. Shore Realt., 759 F.2d at 1039, 1042. The state's suit for recovery of response costs is based
on CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A) which states that responsible parties are liable for "all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by ... a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan."
45. Shore Realtv. 759 F.2d at 1038 n. 3. After a state inspection was requested by Shore's
employees, a stipulation and order were entered on June 15, 1984, requiring Shore to minimize the
threats to the health and environment.
46. Id. at 1039. The inspection occurred on Sept. 19. 1984.
47. Id. at 1037. The district court based its decision on CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A). See also supra
note 44.
48. Shore Realt. 759 F.2d at 1037. The district court originally based the injunction partly on
CERCLA 106 and partly on state common law of public nuisance. However, on remand from the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. the district court grounded the injunction solely on New
York state law of public nuisance because CERCLA 106 abatement authority is available only to
the EPA. Id. at 1049-52 (discussion of CERCLA injunctive relief and common law of public
nuisance).
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independent' response was consistent with the NCP even though the site
was not on the NPL.' ° The issue arises in a cost recovery action "' because
response costs are recoverable only if they are consistent with the NCP. "2
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Shore and
LeoGrande were liable for the state's response costs." The court also
upheld the permanent injunction based on New York's law of public
nuisance."' In addition, the court held CERCLA does not require the state
to show the defendants caused the presence or release of hazardous waste
at the site." Since it concluded that causation was not an issue, the court
also rejected Shore's affirmative defense that the releases were caused by
a third party not within its control. 6 Most importantly, the court held
49. The term "independent" refers to the state performing the response without involvement of
any kind by the federal government. For example. the federal government did not perform any
response actions nor was the site on the federal inventory, the NPL.
50. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045.
51. CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A) or CERCLA 107(a)(4)(B).
52. Both CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A) and CERCLA 107 (a)(4)(B) provide for the recovery of response
costs but the requirement of consistency with the NCP appears in slightly different forms. The federal
and state response cost recovery action, CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A), limits recoverable response costs
to those costs that are not inconsistent with the NCP. The private, non-governmental, response cost
recovery action. CERCLA 107(a)(4)(B), limits recoverable response costs to those costs that are
consistent with the NCP. The difference in language reflects the shifting of the burden of proof.
Under CERCLA 107(a)(4)(A), the federal government or state which seeks recovery of response
costs only has to allege consistency with the NCP and the defendant to the action must prove that
the costs were inconsistent. In contrast, a person bringing suit under CERCLA 107(a)(4)(B) bears
the burden of proof and must affirmatively plead consistency with the NCP. NEPACCO. 579F.Supp.
at 850..
53. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043. Under CERCLA. current owners and operators of a facility
are liable for response costs. CERCLA 101(a)(l). The definition of owner and operator includes:
"any person owning or operating . . .-or [who] otherwise controlled activities at [a]facility immediately prior to such abandonment." CERCLA l0(20)(A). Shore is the undisputed owner of the
facility. LeoGrande is also included within the term owner and operator because of the control he
exercised over corporate activities. Thus both LeoGrande and Shore are responsible for the costs of
response. The leading case concerning the imposition of joint and several liability is United States
v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
54. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1050.
55. Id.at 1044-45. The court reasoned that a requirement of causation in CERCLA 107(a) would
render superfluous the affirmative defense exceptions to liability that are themselves based on causation. The court is following the trend in the district courts that CERCLA is strict, joint, and several
liability. U.S. v. Conservation Chemical Co., 589 F.Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1985); NEPACCO,
579 F.Supp. at 844. Thus if a party is one of the enumerated classes of CERCLA 107, supra note
21, then they are liable for response costs.
56. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044, 1048-49. A potentially responsible party can avoid liability
for response costs if the release was caused by the acts or omissions of a third party. CERCLA
107(bX3). Shore argued that it was not the party responsible for the transportation of the wastes to
the site and that it had exercised due care since taking control of the site. The court rejected this
argument reasoning that the defendants knew of and had control of releases or threats of release at
the time of purchase. Because Shore and LeoGrande allowed the prior tenants to continue operating
the illegal hazardous waste facility the court rejected Shore's claim.
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that the listing of a hazardous waste site on the NPL is not a general
requirement of the NCP5 '
ANALYSIS
Prior to Shore, district courts divided over the issue of the relationship
between the NPL and the NCP. On one end of the spectrum, one district
court held that a site must appear on the NPL in order for the response
to be consistent with the NCP."' This court reasoned that since the NPL
is part of the NCP, the requirement of consistency with the NCP in a cost
recovery action demands listing on the NPL." The court reached its
conclusion by blending two separate sections of CERCLA together: federal response actions (CERCLA 104) and response cost recovery actions
(CERCLA 107(a)). They are, however, two different types of actions and
serve distinctly different purposes. CERCLA 104 guides and limits federal
response actions.' But CERCLA 107(a) does not address the way in
which the response is carried out. Instead, the function of CERCLA 107(a)
is to assign liability for the costs of the response to the release. 6 By
equating presence on the NPL with consistency under the NCP, however,
the court inappropriately imposed a federal response limitation, the NPL,
on cost recovery actions.62
Courts at the opposite end of the spectrum held the presence of a site
on the NPL to be irrelevant to the issue of consistency with the NCP.13
These courts reasoned that the response cost recovery sections are wholly
57. Shore Realv, 759 F.2d at 1046.
58. Cadillac Fairview/Califomia Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 14 E.L.R. 20,376, 20,379 (D.C.C.D.
Cal. 1984). In this case the plaintiff. CadillaclFairview was a private, i.e. non-governmental, party
suing under CERCLA 107(a)(4)(B) to recover response costs. In Shore Realty, however, the plaintiff
is a state government that is seeking recovery of response costs under CERCLA 107(a)(4XA). The
fact that Cadillac/Fairviewwas a privare cost recovery action whereas Shore Realty is a state cost
recovery action is of no significance here. The only significance to the difference in type of plaintiff
is a shifting of the burden of proof. See supra note 52.
59. Cadillac Fairview, 14 E.L.R. at 20,379.
60. For a discussion of federal responses see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
61. The first step in a cost recovery action is the identification of the parties responsible for the
release of hazardous substances. These parties will be liable for the costs incurred in a response
action. CERCLA 107(a)(4)-(4) identifies the four classes of potentially responsible parties liable for
costs of response to a hazardous substance release. See supra note 21.
62. The court's conclusion follows one trend of judicial reasoning which interprets consistency
with the NCP to mean federal approval of any private response action prior to commencement of
the response. Such federal preapproval is required in order for the costs to be recoverable. See. e.g.,
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F.Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985); Bulk
Distribution Centers. Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. N.D. 1984). The furthest
extension of the idea of federal preapproval would require that the site must appear on the NPL for
the response to be consistent with the NCP.
63. State of New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F.Supp. 291 (N.D. N.Y. 1984); Pinole Point
Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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independent of the federal response sections." Consequently, restrictions
that are imposed on federal response actions do not apply to any cost
recovery actions.
The Second Circuit rejected both sides of the split among the district

courts.' Whereas the district courts' reasoning implies limitations in the
scope of the two sections based on an interpretation of a single phrase,
the Second Circuit read several sections together in an effort to find
internal consistency within CERCLA.s' The Second Circuit held that
where a state has responded to a release without any federal involvement,

a site's presence on the NPL is not the appropriate measure for determining

consistency with the NCP.'7 The court looked to the functions of the NPL
to reach its conclusion that listing on the NPL was not generally required

for consistency with the NCP.at The Second Circuit found, in those sections of CERCLA which direct the EPA to create the NPL, that the purpose

of listing a site on the NPL was to establish priorities for remedial, or
long term, responses." But, in Shore Realy, the plaintiff performed a
removal, or emergency, response action.'

Furthermore, the court ob-

64. New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F.Supp. at 302: Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.. 596 F.Supp. at 288-89. The reasoning of these courts is much the same as supra note
60-62 and accompanying text. Most courts reach the conclusion that the two sections are completely
separate through a plain reading of CERCLA 107: "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law... (the responsible parties] ...shall be liable for... all costs [of response.' U.S. v. Wade.
577 F.Supp. at 1336; U.S. v. NEPACCO, 579 F.Supp. at 850-51. It should be noted that some of
the cases cited for the separateness of CERCLA 107 and CERCLA 104 refer to CERCLA 107 and
CERCLA Ill as being separate. However, CERCLA Ill lists permissible uses of the Superfund
which include payment for response actions pursuant to CERCLA 104. Therefore, by extension,
both CERCLA 104 and CERCLA Il l ae separate from CERCLA 107.
65. Shore Realty 759 F.2d at 1046.
66. The Second Circuit specifically rejected the reasoning of two district courts which based the
conclusion that CERCLA 104 and CERCLA 107 were entirely severable on their interpretation of
the single isolated phrase introducing CERCLA 107 "notwithstanding any other provision or rule
of law." CERCLA 107(a). Both of these courts found the language meant section 107 is distinct in
its application and not limited by any other sections of CERCLA or other statutory laws. U.S. v.
Wade, 577 F.Supp. at 1336; U.S. v. NEPACCO, 579 F.Supp. at 850, By extension, therefore,
limitations on federal response actions would not apply in cost recovery actions.
67. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1046.
68. Id. at 1046-47.
69. Remedial responses are defined as "actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead
of or in addition to removal actions." CERCLA 101(24). In CERCLA 105(8)(A), the EPA is required
to draft the NCP and include criteria for determining the top priority response targets for remedial
action. Based on this criteria the next section, CERCLA 105(8KB), requires the EPA to determine
which sites shall be on the list and then promulgate the NPL. In addition, CERCLA 104(a)(1) gives
the EPA the authority to provide remedial action which is consistent with the NCP. Thus, the court
concluded, that the NPL is applicable only to remedial responses.
70. Supra note 44 and accompanying text. Removal is defined as actions "necessary to prevent.
minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment." CERCLA
101(23). Removal responses are generally emergency or short term actions in contrast to remedial
actions which are long term actions.
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served that the NPL was a limitation only on federal response actions. 7 '
In Shore Realty, however, the state of New York performed the response.
Lastly, the court concluded from the legislative history that the NPL is
primarily informational in nature for use in controlling Superfund expenditures."2 Consequently, the Second Circuit held that where a state
pursues a response without any involvement of the federal government,
the non-listing of the site on the NPL will not bar the state's recovery of
response costs. 3
In effect, the Second Circuit strikes a middle ground between the district
court holdings. Whereas the district courts construed the federal response
section and the cost recovery section as totally separate or totally intertwined, the Second Circuit found they are interlinked in some, but not
all, situations. The Second Circuit's holding suggests two factors that
determine when the sections interlink and, consequently, when listing on
the NPL is relevant in a response cost recovery action. The two factors
focus on the identity of the parties in the response action and the type of
response action anticipated.
The key questions surrounding the relevancy of the NPL in a response
cost recovery action are whether the federal government is involved in
the response and whether the response is remedial in nature. Focus on
these factors suggests four scenarios where the two sections might interlink: (1) the state alone performs a removal response; (2) the state, together
with the federal government, performs a removal response; (3) the state
alone performs a remedial response; or (4) the state, together with the
federal government, performs a remedial response.
Of these four possibilities, however, the federal response section interlinks with the cost recovery section in only one instance: where the
state acts together with the federal government in performing a remedial
response. The federal response section is not applicable where the state
is acting alone. Therefore, listing on the NPL is not relevant.' Nor is
listing a requirement when the response is removal, even when the federal
government is involved because the NPL applies only to remedial responses. However, in the case where both the federal government participates and the response is remedial in nature, then listing on the NPL
is required. In this case the NPL performs dual functions: it serves as a
71. For example, in CERCLA 104(a)(1) the EPA is authorized to respond to a release and provide
remedial action. However, before a federally funded remedial response action can begin, a federalstate cooperative cost sharing and cleanup agreement is required. CERCLA 104(c)(3). The federal-

state cleanup must be in accordance with the criteria and priorities established in the NCP. CERCLA
104(d)(1). Because the prioritization in the NCP is the NPL, the NPL acts as a limitation on the
response only when the federal government is involved in some way with the response action.
72. Shore Realry, 759 F.2d at 1047.
73. Id.
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federal response management tool by ranking the sites most deserving of
federal attention and Fund monies, and, at the same time, it limits the
recoverability of response costs by requiring that the costs be incurred in
a manner that is consistent with the NCP which includes listing on the
NPL. Here response cost recoverability is conditioned on NPL listing
because the federal government is involved.
The dual role of the NPL in this fourth scenario is evidence of the
interlinking of the federal response limitation (CERCLA 104) and cost
recovery actions (CERCLA 107(a)). Recognition of the NPL's dual role
supports the interpretation that the two sections are primarily independent
of one another, but acknowledges the fact when the federal government
is involved in a cleanup that these two sections of CERCLA interlink.
When the two sections do interlink, the cost recovery section is limited
by the federal response section because in this situation the minimum
requirement for the recovery of response costs, consistency with the NCP,
is listed on the NPL. The reason for interlinking the two sections of
CERCLA is the same reason the NPL was created: to promote the efficacious use of the limited Superfund monies.
RAMIFICATIONS
The Second Circuit's holding as to the relationship between the National
Priorities List and consistency with the National Contingency Plan is very
narrow. Listing on the NPL is mandatory only when the federal government is involved in a remedial (long-term) response to a release of hazardous substances. In such a situation the federal government is using
Superfund monies directly, 4 and a site must appear on the NPL before
Fund monies can be used to clean it up. The NPL thus serves as a
management tool designed to preserve Fund resources by promoting efficient federal use of limited Superfund monies. Where direct payment
from the Fund is not at issue, the management tool is unnecessary.
By removing the NPL as a limitation on a state's ability to recover
cleanup costs, the holding increases the likelihood that more hazardous
waste sites will be cleaned up. States, once fearful that recovery of response costs will be barred simply because the site is not on the NPL,
will no longer be chilled from responding to non-NPL hazardous waste
sites. Most importantly, the holding permits states to pursue cleanups of
newly discovered hazardous waste sites without having to wait for the site
to be listed on the NPL.
An additional benefit of the decision is that it may encourage private,
74. One of the permitted uses of Fund monies is payment of CERCLA 104 (federal) response
costs. CERCLA 1ll(a)(1).
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that is non-goverimental, responses and cleanups of hazardous waste
sites. Because the only difference between a governmental and a private
response cost recovery action is the burden of proof,75 a private party
seeking non-Fund recovery of response costs is not limited by the NPL
in the same way that the state of New York was not limited by the NPL
in the present case. Consequently, private parties can be secure that if
they respond to a release of hazardous substances, a site's non-listing on
the NPL will not bar recovery of response costs.
CONCLUSION
Justice Oakes' reasoning in Shore provides a firm foundation for application and interpretation of a statute which was labeled as fraught with
inconsistencies and ambiguities. The opinion resolves a conflict of authority which had arisen over the meaning of presence on the National
Priorities List and consistency with the National Contingency Plan. No
longer will state or private parties be deterred from cleaning up non-NPL
hazardous waste sites for fear that the response costs are inconsistent with
the NCP. As a result, more hazardous waste sites may be cleaned up
through the added efforts of state and non-governmental parties. Consequently, the Congressional goal of removing threats to health and environment posed by such sites shall likely be accelerated.
NICHOLAS CULLANDER

75. See supra note 52.

